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1 Introduction
A large set of economic interactions is characterized by conﬂicting interests of
the diﬀerent parties involved in the exchange. The standard economic approach
conceives extrinsic rewards as the only mechanism to align divergent interests.
In particular, the Principal-Agent paradigm provides a manageable framework
to deal with situations of conﬂict involving risk sharing and incentives (among
earlier contributions see, Shavell, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979). In a principal-agent
relationship one party, the principal, derives utility from the outcomes following
actions undertaken by another party, the agent. Furthermore, as the action to
be undertaken by the agent is costly to the agent, the principal will endow the
agent with an extrinsic, usually monetary, reward in order to “convince” the
agent to deliver the expected eﬀort. Among the measures providing incentives
in situations of this kind, the most relevant seem to be monitoring, evalua-
tion and contracting (Prendergast, 1999). The standard economic approach to
agency issues has traditionally been characterized by the assumption of strict
self-interest and full rationality (Grossman and Hart, 1983). However, recent
contributions in the domain of Behavioral Economics have enlarged the scope
of the utility function to encompass also ”psychological“ sources of motivation
springing from social interactions. Among the most successful investigations
into such social preferences it is possible to identify models accounting for eq-
uity(among others, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and
reciprocity(among others, Rabin, 1993). For the purposes of the present con-
tribution it is of particular interest to consider the issue of reciprocity in some
detail. Preferences for reciprocity are mainly aﬀected by the process leading
to an outcome and not by the outcome itself. In particular, when intentions
backing an action are perceived as benevolent, attitudes towards the individual
undertaking that action will be benevolent too. With explicit reference to the
domain of the present analysis, an action is evaluated as benevolent if it is based
on genuine trust. As summarized by (James, 2002, p. 291), “A trusts B means
that A expects that B will not exploit a vulnerability that A has created for
himself by taking the action”.
Trust is an important element for economic relationships as it favors eﬃ-
ciency (on this aspect see, among others, Arrow, 1974) and economic growth
(La Porta et al., 1997; Putnam, 1993). However, as argued by Slovic (1999),
there are psychological aspects which render trust a fragile social artifact. More-
over, once distrust comes into play it is very diﬃcult to reestablish trust as
subjects who proved to be unreliable in the past are not given the opportunity
to show their loyalty in further interactions. A major source of fragility of trust
is the fact that its replication relies on reciprocal attitudes of the counterparts.
Indeed, it has been shown that trust can persist only in environments where sub-
jects systematically refrain from exploiting trustful behavior (G¨ uth and Kliemt,
1994). The work of Fehr and G¨ achter (1998) provides a survey of various em-
pirical and theoretical works supporting the idea of reciprocity as a common
trait of human beings. The authors make an important distinction between
positive and negative reciprocity. The former refers to the desire to reward pos-
itive actions, while the latter refers to retaliation against unfaithful individuals.
From their review it emerges that the Investment Game (Berg et al., 1995) is
an eﬀective design to experimentally investigate trust-based interactions. This
experimental design also provides a fundamental reference for the experiment3
presented here.
The concept of reciprocity has been widely investigated with reference to
labor markets within the theory of eﬃciency wages. Since the seminal work
of Akerlof (1982), the theory has been object of intensive study. At an empir-
ical level, the theory has been investigated using the so-called Gift Exchange
Experiment Fehr et al. (1993). In a standard gift-exchange experiment, ﬁrms
(principals) make oﬀers about wages and workers (agents) can decide whether
to accept an oﬀer or not. Once the oﬀer is accepted a ﬁrm and a worker are
matched and the worker can freely set the level of eﬀort to be provided. Wages
are a cost for the ﬁrm and a source of value for the worker and the opposite holds
for eﬀort levels. The standard economic prediction is that workers set their ef-
fort at the minimum level independently of the wage oﬀer. Firms anticipate this
and accordingly decide to set wages at the minimum possible level. Contrary
to this prediction, experimental work provides evidence of a positive correlation
between oﬀers made by the ﬁrm and performance of the agent. Firms oﬀer
wages higher than the market clearing level to obtain higher levels of eﬀort and
agents appear to repay the ﬁrm’s “gift”.
The focus of the present study is on the interaction between extrinsic moti-
vational sources related with practices restricting personal autonomy and other
determinants of behavior like trust and reciprocity*. Aim of control practices
in a Principal-Agent relationship is to reduce opportunistic behavior and thus
reduce risk borne by the principal. Diﬀerent monitoring practices can serve
this purpose and obtain, under standard economic assumptions, an alignment
of the conﬂicting interests of the parties involved in an agency relationship.
However, works in the psychological literature have shown that when extending
sources of motivation to encompass intrinsic motivations anomalous behavior
may emerge. Intrinsic motivations refer to the desire to take an action for its
own sake and not for the outcomes associated with the action (Ryan and Deci,
2000). Recent experimental works highlighted the importance of intrinsic mo-
tivations to behavior having a relevant economic content. Particular attention
has been paid to the potential crowding-out of intrinsic motivations following
the provision of extrinsic (monetary) rewards (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997;
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). A direct consequence of substitution between
diﬀerent sources of motivations is the violation of the monotonic relation be-
tween incentives and eﬀort. Concerning the motivational crowding-out issue,
works in the economic literature have mainly focused on extrinsic incentives in
the form of monetary rewards but psychological literature has enlarged the in-
quiry also to other extrinsic motivational means. Of particular interest here are
studies dealing with control practices and their impact on decisional autonomy
or self-determination. Autonomy implies free choice of the outcome and of the
means to achieve it. Under control, intentions remain free while actions are
bounded Deci and Ryan (1987).
About the impact of self-determination in a work organization, Deci et al.
(1989) notice that support to autonomy by the management positively impacts
on perception of the organization by the workforce. More focused on the inter-
action between monitoring and eﬀort is the contribution of Frey (1993). From a
cross-disciplines literature review and from empirical evidence the author con-
cludes that the presence of a personalized relationship between the principal and
the agent is likely to foster the crowding out of intrinsic motivations in favor
of extrinsic motivations. The work of Brandts and Charness (2004) investigates4
about the impact of contextual elements on gift-exchange experiments. In one
of the experimental variations presented, a minimum wage is exogenously set.
This restricts not only the opportunity set of the ﬁrm but also of the worker
who, under the minimum wage condition, is “forced to be generous”. When the
minimum wage is exogenously set, eﬀort provided by the workers is generally
lower than when no restriction is set and, furthermore, also the likelihood of ob-
serving high wages sharply decreases. The work of Falk and Kosfeld (200x) also
deals with incomplete contracts but introduces a diﬀerent kind of restriction on
agents’ decisional autonomy. In their experiment, the principal has the option of
bounding actions of the agent through the provision of a mandatory minimum
level of performance. Under standard economic assumptions the restriction is
always preferred by the principal who ensures herself against opportunistic be-
havior. However, the authors ﬁnd that due to “control-averse” behavior the
agents tend to oﬀer a lower performance when their decisional autonomy is
bounded than when they are let free to choose positive eﬀort without any lower
bound restriction. From this it follows that ex post principals preserving agent’s
decisional autonomy, the large majority in the experiment, are made better oﬀ
than those relying on the control device. The authors extend results from the
experiment to control practices in general and observe that signals of distrust
associated with control may be counterproductive. The authors implicitly as-
sume that the minimum wage restriction conveys only a signal of distrust and no
other relevant information. However, one can ask whether the voluntary provi-
sion of a minimum wage is subject to alternative interpretations. In particular,
it seems plausible to argue that agents may interpret the minimum wage as an
acceptable level of eﬀort from the principal point of view and thus reduce their
feelings of guilty.
The present paper addresses the same research question of Falk and Kosfeld
(200x) but employs a radically diﬀerent experimental design*. The basic in-
teraction structure employed is provided by the Investment Game as presented
by Berg et al. (1995). In order to address the causal relationship between con-
trol practices introduced by the principal and reciprocity attitudes shown by
the agent the following modiﬁcation is introduced: before any transfer between
the to parties takes place, the principal can decide whether to adopt a strategy
restricting the decisional autonomy of the agent at a given cost. When control
is not implemented, the two parties move to the following stage of the game
(i.e., standard Investment Game) with the principal and the agent playing the
role of the trustor and the trustee, respectively. When control is enforced the
agent is asked to state the conditional repayment for each amount potentially
sent by the principal in the Investment Game. Then, the principal chooses the
amount to send to the agent who is given no further chance to renegotiate the
repayment commitment. The amount sent by the principal is multiplied by a
positive factor and payoﬀs are calculated on the basis of the stated intentions
of the agent.
The results of the experiment show that very few principals decide to warrant
autonomy to the matched agent. In general, the agents do not reward the
autonomy supportive option undertaken by the principal. In fact, they behave
in a very opportunistic way when playing the investment game by sending back
very low amounts. Given the lack of reciprocity of the agents, decisions of the
principals turn out to be correct. In fact, they are relatively better oﬀ when
implementing the control strategy than when warranting decisional autonomy5
to the agents.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
experimental design; section 3 discusses diﬀerent preference structures of the
agents and outlines the associated behavioral predictions in the game; section 4
analyzes the data collected in the experiment; section 5 includes the discussion
of the results and directions for future research.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 The Experiment
The basic strategic structure of the game employed in the experiment resembles
real-life situations in which complete contracts are not at disposal and trust
is required to reach the socially desirable outcome. As an example consider a
situation in which an employer (i.e., the principal) has to decide how much to
invest in the training of an employee (i.e., the agent). The decision is risky for
the employer as long as there are no opportunities to restrict the employee’s ac-
tion after the completion of the training. Thus, the employee has the incentive
to exploit the opportunity to be trained by the current employer and then be
hired by another ﬁrm at a salary which accounts for the increase in productivity
following the training but not for its cost. The current employer opens a vulner-
ability for herself by ”sponsoring” the training of the employee. An interaction
of this kind is well captured by the Investment Game (Berg et al., 1995). In the
Investment Game two parties, the trustor and the trustee, are endowed with
an initial amount of money. The trustee is given the opportunity to invest the
initial endowment in a revenue-generating asset. Proﬁts are not appropriated
by the trustor but are transferred to the trustee. At this stage the trustee can
freely decide whether to return some of the revenues to the trustor. The stan-
dard economic prediction (i.e., the sub-game perfect equilibrium) for the game
is that the trustor anticipates that the trustee will return nothing. This gives
no incentive to the Trustor to invest any portion of the initial endowment. The
current design builds on the experimental framework of Berg et al. by provid-
ing the principal with a device to circumvent vulnerability. Before entering this
investment the principal is oﬀered the opportunity of knowing in advance, at a
cost c, the future actions of the agent. The availability of the detection option
and the actual choice of the principal are known to the agent1.
[Figure 1 to be inserted here]
Figure 1 provides a graphical description of the game which will be hence-
forth identiﬁed as The Detection Game. The experimental game is a sequential
game with complete and perfect information. The ﬁrst decisional node belongs
to the principal (P) who has to decide whether to detect (D = 1) or not (D = 0),
at a cost c, the intentions of the agent in the subsequent interaction. When a
principal decides to warrant the decisional autonomy to the matched agent, and
thus not to know in advance her actions in the subsequent interaction, the two
1The control mechanism employed in the experiment captures informational features of
monitoring mechanisms which allow to infer future performances of a subject from current
characteristics of the same. An example of control practices of this kind is provided by medical
tests on the habits and health status of the employers6
players move towards a standard Investment Game. After having chosen to set
D = 0, the principal selects the amount x of her endowment E she intends to
invest. The amount sent is multiplied by an exogenously given factor m and
added to initial endowment E of the agent. Then, the agent decides how much
she wants to return to the principal from the amount received mx. After having
collected the decisions of the agent the payoﬀs of the players are computed.
When a principal decides to restrict the autonomy of the agent, and thus
to know in advance her future actions, an amount c is withdrawn from the
initial endowment E of the principal. Under the bounding strategy the agent is
asked to fulﬁll a vector, henceforth called repayment vector (see Table 1), where
binding associations between each possible amount sent by the principal and the
amount returned by the agent (y|x) are made. Amounts reported in the vector
cannot be renegotiated at any further stage of the experiment. When ﬁlling the
repayment vector each agent commits to actually undertake the action reported
in the vector. The fulﬁlled vector is sent to the principal who then chooses the
amount she is going to send to the agent. Given this interaction structure the
monetary payoﬀs of the trustor and of the trustee are equal to Π1 = E − x + y
and Π2 = E − y + mx, respectively. The game is played only once in order to
rule out possible confounding factors associated with repetition of the game.
2.2 Experimental Procedures
The computer-based experiment was run at the Computable and Experimental
Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. A client-server in-
frastructure purposely built using the programminglanguage Borland c   Delphi c  
was employed. Participants were undergraduate students of the University of
Trento and most of them had a training in Economics. Three identical sessions
were run with 16 participants per session (N = 3x16 = 48 Subjects).
Before the interaction, instructions2 were read loudly by the experimenter
and participants were free to ask for clariﬁcations. Each participant was en-
dowed, independently from the role in the experiment, with 10 units of Exper-
imental Currency Unit (ECU). At the end of the experiment, each ECU was
exchanged with e0.33 and participants were paid accordingly. A show-up fee of
e2 was assigned to each participant and this made the maximum gain from the
participation to the experiment equal to e12. On average the experiment lasted
40 minutes. Anonymity among the participants was warranted during and af-
ter the game; matching between the subjects was randomly determined and no
communication among the participants was allowed. A control questionnaire
was submitted to the participants before the beginning of the interaction so as
to prevent mistakes due to a lack of understanding of the experimental instruc-
tions. The experiment started only after all participants correctly answered all
the question.
[Table 1 to be inserted here]
A strategy method was employed to collect responses of the agents. In more
details, agents had to ﬁll in two distinct forms in two sequential screen-shots
before knowing the actual choice of the principal in correspondence to the ﬁrst
2see Table 4 for an English version instructions. Instructions for the experiment were
written in Italian7
decisional node. A representation of the repayment vectors is reported in Table
1. While agents were asked to ﬁll in both vectors in Table 1, the actual vector
presented to the principal was made dependent on her choice in correspondence
to the ﬁrst decisional node in the Detection Game. When opting for detection,
a vector similar to the one reported in the upper panel of Table 1 and containing
“promised” repayments from the matched agent was sent to the principal. When
autonomy of the agent was preserved nothing was submitted to the principal
before collecting her choices in the sub-game represented by the Investment
Game.
3 Behavioral Predictions
As presented in section 3, under standard economic assumptions of rationality
and self-seekingness two distinct sub-game perfect equilibrium outcomes can
be identiﬁed in the Detection Game. One of them is that resulting from the
composed decision of the principal to avoid the implementation of detection (i.e.,
D = 0) and submit nothing in the following node corresponding to the choice
in the Investment Game (x = 0). Given these principal’s action proﬁle, the
opportunity set of the agent results in an empty set, which necessarily implies
a null amount sent back by the agent (y = 0).
In correspondence to the alternative equilibrium outcome, the principal de-
cides to pay the amount c and to undertake the detection option (D = 1).
Under this bounding condition, the best action for the agent is to fully exploit
the gains associated with the multiplier factor m by inducing the principal to
send all the available endowment (E − c). At this end, the agent will commit
herself to a repayment equal to E − c + ǫ when facing the maximum amount
sent by the principal. Given that y ∈ {0,...,mx}, ǫ will be equal to 1. The
additional condition (y|x  = 9)−(E −c) < 1 allows the agent to obtain the best
outcome. When the two conditions above are respected, the principal will have
no incentives to choose an amount x  = 9. In sum, the equilibrium outcome will
be reached through the following actions: the principal decides to implement
detection (D = 1) and to submit the whole available endowment (x = E − c),
while the agent provides the minimal reward (y = E−c+1) to the amount sent
by the principal. Given the parameters employed in the experiment (i.e., m = 2
and E = 10) the couple of payoﬀs π of the principal and the agent obtained
under the former equilibrium are πP = 10 and πA = 10, respectively. Those
obtained in the latter are equal to πA = 10 and πB = 18. What can be observed
with reference to the two equilibrium’s outcomes is that the latter delivers a sit-
uation which is Pareto superior and, thus, socially preferable. However, higher
risk is associated to the strategy leading to this equilibrium when accounting
for potential “anomalous” behavior of the agents.
Previous contributions have already shown that individuals are generally
characterized by reciprocity concerns. What emerges from the relevant liter-
ature is that reciprocity is a function of both the actions undertaken by the
counterpart and the contextual factors aﬀecting intrinsic motivations. These
behavioral aspects can be investigated within the simple interaction structure
presented in section 2.1 via the introduction of a modiﬁed value function of the
agent. The main innovation in the behavioral value function is the fact that
the agents obtain some value from returning to the principal a proportion of8
the amount sent by the same. The source of value is the reciprocation of a
choice taken by another individual in a condition of trust. In addition, it is
assumed that reciprocity concerns are present only when decisional autonomy
is warranted to the agent. Aim of this assumption is to capture the positive
interaction between self-determination and reciprocity.
Under the simple behavioral characterization examined here the value func-
tion of the agent can be represented as VA = E − y + mx − (1 − D)(y − rx)2.
The value function diﬀers from the payoﬀ function πA because of the compo-
nent −(1 − D)(y − rx)2. This source of value captures the psychological cost
associated with repayments which are higher/lower than the perceived kindness
of the action undertaken by the principal3. Perceived kindness is measured by
the factor rx where x is the monetary amount sent by the principal and r is
a multiplier factor deﬁning the reciprocity value attached by the agent to the
amount received. When r > 1 the agent is a positive reciprocator, while an
r < 1 registers the absence of positive reciprocity concerns. In the limit case of
r = 0, the equilibrium behavior of an agent characterized by a value function
VA is the same as the behavior of an agent concerned with the mere monetary
payoﬀs.
To obtain a testable behavioral prediction the assumption that agents are
characterized by positive reciprocity (i.e., r > 1) is employed. Given a continu-
ously diﬀerentiable agent’s value function VA and xij ∈ [0,E] and yj ∈ [0,mxij],
where xij is the amount sent by principal i to agent j and yj is the amount re-
turned by agent j, it can be easily shown that the best reply function for any
agent j is equal to y∗
j = rxij − 1/2. From this it follows that the best action
for the principal is to send the whole available endowment when r > 1 and to
send nothing when r < 1. Thus, given the agent’s value function VA and the
assumption of positive reciprocity characterizing the agents, the unique equilib-
rium outcome in the behavioral characterization of the game is deﬁned by the
following actions: the principal does not implement the detection device and
sends the whole available amount to the agent (i.e., x∗ = E). Then, the agent
returns to the principal an amount y∗ = rx∗ which is bigger than E.
While the previous equilibrium behavior is derived with explicit reference
to a game played in the continuum of choices available to the agent and the
principal, the experiment is played with integer numbers. However, the equi-
librium outcomes identiﬁed provide a useful guidance also for the interaction in
the game. Indeed, in the experimental game a principal will choose to preserve
agent’s autonomy and submit all her endowment whenever she believes that a
positive correlation between self-determination and reciprocity exists and the
agent has a predisposition to positive reciprocity.
The behavioral predictions deﬁned above will be checked against data col-
lected in the experiment. Given that the alternative assumptions of self-regarding
rationality and reciprocity predict distinct equilibrium outcomes, it will be pos-
sible to determine which of the two assumptions is closer to the actual nature
of subjects in the experiment.
3An implicit assumption of the modeling strategy undertaken here is that neither the
principal nor the agent is concerned of the relative ﬁnal allocation of payoﬀs. This assumption
is supported by the work of McCabe et al. (2003) which shows that behavior in trust games
is mainly driven by reciprocity concerns and not by considerations about payoﬀs allocation9
4 Data Analysis
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Some descriptive statistics about choices of the principals and payoﬀs of the two
parties in the game are reported in Table 24. The choices of the agent are better
detailed in Figure 2.
[Table 2 to be inserted here]
4.1.1 Principals
As reported in Table 2, only 6 (i.e., 25% of the total sample) principals choose
to preserve self-determination of the matched agent. Thus, the vast majority
of principals prefer to gain control over agent’s actions. The amount sent by
the principals under the autonomy supportive condition is on average quite low
(1.50 ECU) and smaller than the average amount sent under the detection
condition (4.31 ECU). Principals are, on average, relatively better oﬀ when
choosing detection than when moving directly to the sub-game represented by
the Investment Game (proﬁts are 10.46 vs 8.83 ECU, respectively).
Table 2 highlights also that, independently of the presence of autonomy in deci-
sion making, a negative median return on investment is registered. Concerning
responses of the principals to the repayment commitment of the agent, it can
be observed that 12 principals out of 13 (92.30%) choose to submit the amount
x maximizing their payoﬀ given the repayment vector submitted by the agent.
This signals a strong commitment to proﬁt maximization and a good under-
standing of the mechanisms of the game.
4.1.2 Agents
Figure 2 provides a representation of the choices of the agents under the two
detection conditions. The X-axis reports the hypothetical amount x submitted
by the principal, while the Y-axis reports the amount y to which the agent
commits herself. Individual choices appear on the graph as jittered empty cir-
cles5 and boxplots provide the usual synthetic description of the distribution of
choices. In correspondence to the average amount y conditional to x a ﬁlled
circle is depicted. The 45◦ dashed line provides a graphical reference to identify
the reciprocity content of each observation. In particular, values located above
the line are characterized by positive reciprocity (i.e., y > x).
[Figure 2 to be inserted here]
From the upper panel in Figure 2, it can be observed that when no detec-
tion is present the values of y are not very sensitive to the diﬀerent values of x.
4A malfunctioning of the computer hardware of one of the terminals caused a loss in
the data. In particular, given the nature of the software employed for the experiment, 5
observations referring to the amounts sent by the principal and to proﬁts of both players are
missing. Concerning choices of the agent, only the observation corresponding to the computer
causing the malfunctioning is missing from the dataset, that 23 observations for each x under
the two detection condition are collected. It is important to remark here that the data analysis
is not heavily aﬀected by the loss in the data as it focuses mainly on choices of the agents.
5A small white noise has been added to each observation to allow a 4better appraisal of
individual choices10
Median repayment switches from 0, when the hypothetical amount sent is lower
than 3, to 1 in correspondence to values of x higher than 3. This signals a very
low level of reciprocity concerns among the agents when playing the Investment
Game. In correspondence to the total endowment submitted by the agent (i.e.,
x = 10), only 1 observation out of 23 (4.34%) is located in the positive reci-
procity area. A similar pattern is registered also in correspondence to the other
values of x. At a more detailed level it can be observed that, independently of
the value of x, most of the observations are clustered in correspondence to the
rational selﬁsh equilibrium value y = 0. Taken together these observations lead
to the conclusion that positive reciprocity is nearly absent under the autonomy
supportive condition and, moreover, agents show a behavior which is very close
to the rational self-seeking prediction as outlined in section 3.
In the lower panel of Figure 2 the choices of the agent under the detec-
tion condition are reported. From the ﬁgure it emerges that the choices of the
agents are quite sensitive to oﬀers of the principals. Median and average re-
turn in correspondence to each potential oﬀer of the principal are quite close
to the positive reciprocity threshold represented by the dashed 45◦ line. Pair-
wise non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon signed rank test) reveal that diﬀerences
between choices under the two alternative detection conditions are statistically
signiﬁcant, at least, at the conventional 5% level for x > 1.
Recalling behavioral predictions illustrated in section 3, it is interesting to fo-
cus on agent’s behavior in correspondence to the maximum amount sent by the
principal (i.e., x = 9). The average amount sent back is very close to the median
value of the distribution (8.00) and equal to 7.82 ECU. On average, values reg-
istered are lower than expected under rationality assumptions (i.e., 10 ECU).
Parametric and non-parametric tests strongly reject the null hypothesis that
values registered are on average equal to 10 (t-test, p.value = 0.024; Wilcoxon
signed rank test, p.value = 0.013).
4.2 Regression Analysis
The regression analysis reported in Table 3 provides a description of agent’s
behavior in the experiment. The dependent variable in the model is represented
by the decisions of the agent (yi). The explanatory variables employed in the
regression are the amount sent by the principal for each amount y under the
two detection condition (xD
ij) and a dummy variable capturing the presence
of detection (D = 1 if detection is present and D = 0 otherwise). Given that
several data points are collected in correspondence to the same agent (as choices
are collected through repayment vectors), a control on clustering of errors at
the individual level is introduced. Given that the support of agent’s decisions
is deﬁned over integer numbers, a generalized linear model (Poisson family) is
estimated.
[Table 3 to be inserted here]
From the estimation reported in Table 3 it emerges that the amount sent by
the principal has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the amount returned by the
agent. This testiﬁes the presence of some form of reciprocity in the population
of agents but, as evidenced above, the amount returned to the principal is on
average lower than the amount sent by the principal. The impact of detection11
on the amount sent by the agent is positive and signiﬁcant. The same holds also
for the interaction term between the two explanatory variables. Agents under
detection systematically return more than agents provided with full autonomy
at the decisional stage. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term evidences how
the reciprocity attached to the amount sent by the principal is stronger under
detection than in the complementary condition. Overall, very low levels of
repayment are registered but, contrary to what expected under the behavioral
prediction, higher levels emerged in the autonomy restrictive condition.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The kind of interaction experimentally investigated here provides a manage-
able framework to study the impact of self-determination on choices involving
trust and reciprocity. A strong pattern emerging from the data collected in the
laboratory is that a small minority of principals decides to warrant decisional
autonomy to the matched agent. Furthermore, undertaking the autonomy sup-
portive opportunity is not associated with full trust in the counterpart as very
low amounts of endowment are submitted to the agent in the standard invest-
ment game following the detection decisional node. However, this cautious
behavior turns out to be the appropriate one given the overall negative returns
registered in the investment game as a consequence of the opportunistic be-
havior of the agents. In the case of restriction of agent’s autonomy, despite a
positive correlation between amount sent by the principal and the response of
the matched agent, the overall amount sent back by the agents is not enough to
deliver positive returns to the investment undertaken by the principals. With
reference to the behavioral predictions outlined in section 3, it can be noticed
that the amount to which the agent commits herself when the principal sends
the whole amount available is lower than what expected under standard eco-
nomic assumptions. The gap between observed behavior and the rationality
benchmark may be due either to a lack of understanding of the strategic struc-
ture of the game or to negative reciprocity. An agent endowed with negative
reciprocity may be willing to incur a cost in order to punish behavior which is
perceived as unfair (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). With explicit reference to the
experimental context, while it is not possible to dismiss a priori the negative
reciprocity hypothesis, it can be argued that the ratio between the cost borne by
the agent and the cost faced by the principal is very high. This evidence casts
some doubts on the negative reciprocity interpretation. Behavior of the agents
forces a consideration also about opportunity costs associated with choices of the
principals. When accounting for anomalous behavior of the agents the strategy
undertaken by the vast majority of the principals is riskier than the alternative
rational behavior identiﬁed in section 3 (i.e., not to implement detection and
invest nothing). The distribution of payoﬀs in the experiment reveals that the
risk borne by the majority of principals is not rewarded. Indeed, the median
outcome is lower than what they would have obtained choosing the alternative
rational strategy.
The outcomes of this experiment radically diﬀer from previous contribu-
tions ﬁnding positive reciprocity in correspondence to the choice of preserving
decisional autonomy of the counterpart. Further research is needed to address
the origins of these diﬀerences but some directions for future inquiry can be12
identiﬁed here. Restrictions to decisional autonomy are not introduced by set-
ting a lower bound to wages or eﬀort levels like in previous study (respec-
tively, Brandts and Charness, 2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 200x) but by a manipu-
lation of the sequence of moves in the game. Compared to the mere introduction
of a minimum threshold, the treatment implemented in the experiment induces
a more articulated strategic reasoning. It may be that higher levels of cognitive
load crowd-out other-regarding concerns (G¨ uth et al., 2005) and this leads to a
substitution of reciprocity with self-oriented strategic concerns. This could pro-
vide a partial explanation to the observed diﬀerences between our and previous
ﬁndings. However, it must also be observed that setting a lower bound is likely
to induce anchoring to that value. At this aim, the control treatment reported
by Falk and Kosfeld does not dismiss the case that the lower bound set by the
principal is interpreted by the agent as an acceptale level of eﬀort. If this was
the case the result of lower reciprocity under conditions of control would not be
caused by limitations of self-determination but by a reduction in the feelings of
guilty of the agents.
To summarize, behavior observed in the laboratory is very far from the
autonomy-triggered reciprocity prediction and much closer to behavior observed
under standard economic assumptions. The departure from the behavioral
benchmark accounting for social preferences is mainly due to the fact that the
principals correctly forecast the opportunistic behavior of the agents in the trust-
based interaction. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that agents do not fully
exploit the eﬃciency gains in the game. This sub-optimal behavior may be due
either to cognitive limits in the representation of the strategic structure of the
interaction or, less likely, to a strong preference for negative reciprocity following
the introduction of detection. Further research is needed to disentangle these
two sources of behavior.13
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Table 1: Repayment Vectors
x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Detection (D = 0) y
x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Detection (D = 1) y
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Subject Variable Detection N∗ Mean Median Std. dev.
Principal Choice Yes 13.00 4.31 3.00 3.84
No 6.00 1.50 1.00 1.87
Proﬁts Yes = 10.46 9.00 3.18
No = 8.83 9.50 1.60
Agent Proﬁts Yes = 12.85 11.00 3.46
No = 12.67 11.50 3.44
∗ Total observations expected are N=24. Missing observations are due to an hardware
failure in session 2 of the experiment. See footnote in section 4 for more details)
Table 3: Generalized Linear Mixed-Eﬀects Regression on Agent’s Choices (Pois-
son Family)
y ∼ offer + detection + offer ∗ detection
Coeﬃcient Std. Error z Pr( |z|)
x 0.181 0.023 7.896 2.89e-15
detection 0.583 0.184 3.176 1.49e-03
x ∗ detection 0.055 0.027 2.013 4.41e-0216
Table 4: Intructions (Translation from Italian)
Dear Participant,
this is neither an IQ test nor a test aimed at measuring your skills but an interaction
in which you will be asked to choose according to your preferences. You will receive
a reward at the end of the experiment which is proportional to the outcome of the
interaction below described. Moreover, independently from the interaction, you will
receive a payment of e2. Before starting the experiment you will be asked to an-
swer some questions aimed at verifying your understanding of the experiment. Your
answer to the questionnaire will not aﬀect the payoﬀ you are going to earn but the
experiment will not start until all the participants have answered all the questions
correctly. Amounts presented in the experiment are expressed in ECU (Experimental
Currency Units). At the end of the experiment amounts expressed in ECU are con-
verted in e at an exchange rate of e1 each 3 ECU. Two diﬀerent roles are present
in the experiment and they are referred to as Subject A and Subject B. You will be
randomly assigned one of the two roles at the beginning of the experiment and you will
maintain that role throughout all the experiment. Each Subject A is randomly and
anonymously matched with a Subject B. Only one interaction will take place during
the experiment. The experiment is based on the following interaction scheme:
1. Subject A and Subject B in a couple both receive 10 ECU
2. Subject A can decide how many of her 10 ECU send to Subject B
3. The ECU sent by A are multiplied by two and assigned to B
4. B decides how many of the ECU previously sent by A and multiplied by the
factor of 2 send to A (please notice that the amount sent to A can be at most
equal to the amount received from A and multiplied by a factor of 2)
5. The interaction ends with computation of the ECU belonging to A and B, the
conversion in e and actual payment of the amount due to Subject A and
Subject B. The number of ECU of A at the end of the interaction are equal
to the 10 ECU assigned as initial endowment decreased by the ECU sent to B
and increased by the ECU received from B. At the end of the experiment B will
detain a number of ECU equal to the 10 ECU assigned as initial endowment
increased by the ECU received from A multiplied by two and decreased by the
ECU sent to A.
With respect to the interaction structure previously described a variation is introduced
in the experiment: At the beginning of the experiment, before phase 2) starts, Subject
A can decide whether to pay 1 ECU and monitor the repayment intentions of B in
what above is deﬁned phase 4). Subject B has to ﬁll a vector in which is speciﬁed
for each possible amount of ECU sent by A the repayment intentions of B. In more
details, in two distinct screenshots Subject B must state how much she plans to return
to Subject B if A decides of NOT buying the right to monitor intention and if A decides
to buy the right. When A decides to buy the information the correspondent vector
ﬁlled by B will be shown to A who will thus decide how much send to B knowing in
advance the amount returned by B. When A decides of NOT buying the information
no vector is shown to A who has to choose how much send to B without having any
information on intentions of B. It is important to remark that under this condition
the information provided by B remain hidden and the decision of A is not aﬀected by
the information provided by B in any way.
The experiment ends with the computation of the ECU belonging to Subject A and
to Subject B after the interaction previously described and their conversion in e. Are
there any questions?17
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